Many Nigerians and foreign observers wonder how Boko Haram funds its operations. How has Boko Haram raised funds for its war on the Nigerian state for over a decade? Who finances the group?.
At the peak of the war, Nigerian financial intelligence agencies began an investigation to know the financiers of terrorism in Africa’s most populous country. The more than 10-year hunt yielded its latest result in March when the federal government sanctioned several individuals and entities for allegedly financing terrorism.
The list includes six Nigerians sentenced to 10 years to life in prison in 2019 for establishing a Boko Haram cell in the United Arab Emirates (UAE) to raise cash for the insurgents in Nigeria.
The administration of former President Muhammadu Buhari arrested 96 suspected sponsors of terrorism and 424 of their associates in 2021. The government also identified 123 companies and 33 Bureau De Change (BDC) operators linked with terrorism by the fraud unit of the Nigeria Financial Intelligence Unit (NFIU).
Using the NFIU secret intelligence reports and multiple interviews with the arrested suspects, PREMIUM TIMES now reports that in the course of their investigations, Nigerian security agents perpetrated one of the worst cases of injustice in the country, holding suspects captive for 16 months without trial.
After the long detention period, most of the suspects were allowed to go; some were charged to court while others remained in detention.
Our findings show that the government held the suspects at secret locations in Abuja, denying them access to lawyers and family members for several months. The victims, who have been threatened not to speak to the press, said they were unjustly detained for months without even knowing the accusations against them.
After days of detention, the suspects found out that they were being investigated for financial dealings with alleged terrorists.
Former Information Minister Lai Mohammed first announced sanctions against the 96 suspects in 2022, adding that the government would prosecute them immediately.
The extent of these suspects’ detentions and the intimidation tactics used against them have not been previously reported.
Although issuing sanctions, including arrests, aligns with the United Nations Security Council Resolution on Suppression of Terrorism, what is more important is using evidence and the law to disrupt terrorism financing and the economies of violence that sustain terrorist and non-state armed groups.
An internal, ‘top-secret’ report from the NFIU, a copy of which PREMIUM TIMES obtained, provides financial intelligence about the activities of terrorist groups in Nigeria.
The NFIU concluded its analysis of the activities and determined the final reports on 31 January 2022. A copy of the detailed analysis and discoveries was submitted to the president for action, PREMIUM TIMES learnt.
The NFIU has the mandate to collect important financial information. However, our reporting reveals that crucial information is often lacking, including on terrorist financing prosecutions and convictions and other relevant issues.
Unlawful detention of suspects
As soon as the night fell on 10 March 2021, Nigeria’s secret police, the SSS, began calling Bureau de Change operators (BDC) in Kano to invite them for questioning over alleged terrorism financing.
Of the 96 suspects identified by the NFIU, 58 were from Kano State. PREMIUM TIMES located 48 of those and interviewed most of them. All those interviewed asked that their real names not be revealed for fear of further victimization by the authorities.
By 13 March 2021, the SSS had taken most of the suspects into custody in Kano. That day, the service profiled them and took their mugshots. Then, the suspects were released and asked to report back to the SSS office on 16 March 2021.
From the SSS office, the suspects were taken to the army’s Bukavu Barracks in Kano and then to Kaduna, where they spent two days before they arrived in Abuja, PREMIUM TIMES learnt.
In Abuja, they were kept for several days before the interrogation began. “Some officials then told us that based on our bank transactions, we were suspected to be among the sponsors of Boko Haram,” said Idris Yakubu*, one of the detained suspects.
“I don’t have any crime record,” Mr Yakubu continued. “I had never been to a police station for any reason. All of a sudden, I am now being investigated for financing Boko Haram,” he added, nodding his head in regret as he recounted the time spent in detention.
Mr Yakubu’s family and business partners said he didn’t commit the crime he was accused of and that his detention was a violation of his rights. “The nature of our business is about financial transactions, and we deal with all sorts of people, but I will never deal with a criminal knowingly, let alone a sponsor of terrorists,” Mr Yakubu said.
According to the UN Convention on the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism (UNCSFT), terrorism financing (TF) occurs when a person by any means, directly or indirectly, unlawfully and willfully provides or collects funds with the intention that such funds will be used or in the knowledge that the funds will be used in full or in part to carry out a terrorism act.
The UN convention thus indicates that the financier must have the intent (willfully provides) to finance terrorism, something the NFIU and Nigerian authorities could not establish against most of the suspects.
Instead, in its analysis, the agency said it identified some of the suspects only based on direct financial transactions with convicted persons.
The agency also relied on information from the Nigerian Army and other law enforcement agencies to arrive at its conclusion.
Out of the 48 arrested in Kano, PREMIUM TIMES met 40 freed since July 2022. Speaking with our reporter at the first meeting in May and later in June, Mr Yakubu said life was not the same after his detention.
“I have lost all my business partners. My children dropped out of school for most of the period I was in detention. Nobody will pay for school fees. My wife became hypertensive. The impact is just beyond measure,” Mr Yakubu added.
Even though he is still heartbroken, Mr Yakubu has accepted his fate as the will of God.
“I can only thank God for keeping me alive and for the fact that I am a free person now. Finally, after the so-called investigation, we were asked to go. Because they couldn’t demonstrate that most of us had any relationship with the terrorists,” Mr Yakubu said.
He told PREMIUM TIMES that he wants justice for the illegal detention. “We deserve justice. For keeping us 16 months without trial and only for the authorities to free us then, it’s unjust. I don’t have the means to pursue it, so it’s just a wish for now.”
Legal and Human Rights expert Inibehe Effiong said the prolonged detention of the suspects is illegal.
“There is no law in Nigeria that empowers any law enforcement agency to detain anyone indefinitely or arbitrarily. It doesn’t matter whether the offence is terrorism or murder,” Mr Effiong said.
Pre-trial detention is limited in Nigeria. Section 35 of the Nigerian constitution guarantees personal liberty and that no person shall be deprived of such liberty. By the law, no person shall be detained beyond 24 hours without trial, except there is no court within 40 kilometres. It is only where there is no court within 40 kilometres that a person can be detained for 48 hours; afterwards, the person must be arraigned in court.
“However, for the purpose of investigation in serious or alleged offences like terrorism financing or murder, law enforcement agencies are empowered by the Administration of Criminal Justice Act to go before a federal high court to obtain permission from the court to detain a suspect for a specified period (sometimes two weeks or 30 days at first instance),” Mr Effiong said.
“Anything outside that is illegal. If there is convincing evidence of committing an offence, the remedy in law is not to detain the suspect indefinitely. It’s to arraign the person in court,” the Human Rights lawyer said.
Nigeria’s Fight against Terrorism Financing
Between 2008 and 2024, Nigeria enacted the following laws and regulations: the Money Laundering (Prohibition) Act, 2011 (MLPA), to strengthen preventive measures on money laundering and terrorism financing; the Nigerian Financial Intelligence Unit Act, 2018 (NFIU), to ensure the operational autonomy of the NFIU; and the Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters Act, 2019 (MLACMA) to facilitate mutual legal assistance in criminal matters, including money laundering, associated predicate offences and terrorism financing; and the Terrorism Prevention Act (TPA).
Still, the country has brought only a handful of significant cases for terrorism financing, in what appears to be the prioritisation of catching violent terrorists over their financiers.
The Nigerian authorities do not typically conduct stand-alone terrorism financing investigations. Instead, they conduct parallel financial investigations of terrorist suspects identified using intelligence and law enforcement tools.
Led by the SSS, the authorities analyse and investigate financial profiles and activities with assistance from the NFIU. While the country claims to know dozens of Boko Haram sponsors, it hasn’t been able to convict a considerable number.
So far, the authorities have provided little evidence demonstrating the extent or effectiveness of Nigeria’s terrorism financing investigations or their ability to identify terrorist financiers or financing activity, the Inter-Governmental Action Group against Money Laundering in West Africa (GIABA) said in its 2021 report.
“The content of terrorism financing-related reports the NFIU has received has not been useful enough to inform operational or strategic analysis meaningfully. Authorities have not used financial information to identify new terrorist networks or, more generally, broaden Nigeria’s understanding of terrorist activity.”
As of January, Nigeria was one of 21 countries, including its Lake Chad Basin neighbour Cameroon, on the Financial Action Task Force grey list. The list names countries’ with weak measures to combat money laundering and terrorist financing.’
‘Detention crippled our business’
Like Mr Yakubu, Umar Farouk* was also arrested in Kano. While Mr Yakubu was contacted through the BDC union in Kano, Mr Farouk was directly invited by the SSS for questioning.
“The invitation was casual, so I never knew it was the beginning of months-long detention,” Mr Farouk told PREMIUM TIMES. “It was cruel. Staying in detention for 16 months, knowing that I didn’t commit the crime I was accused of.
“That detention crippled our businesses. Physically, we were not tortured, but mentally, it was torture. Some people develop life-threatening health conditions such as high blood pressure, sight deficiency, and heart attack while in detention,” he added.
Mr Farouk recalled that over 40 men were in their cell, most from Kano, Sokoto, Kaduna and Borno states.
Only six people were arraigned, while 42 others including Messrs Farouk and Yakubu, were granted bail after 16 months. Four of the six people being tried are on bail, while two are still in detention.
The two people still in detention are Mansur Usman and Abubakar Sadik. Authorities believe they have strong cases and evidence against the two.
Mr Farouk said it was a challenging period: “I must admit. I didn’t even see the sky throughout that period. But there is nothing we can do. We were patient, and they let us go as free people after the investigation. The truth sets us free. If they had serious evidence incriminating us, then we wouldn’t have been here today.”
The SSS refused to reply to PREMIUM TIMES questions for this story. Its spokesperson, Peter Afunanya, did not respond to calls and a text message sent to his phone.
“Detaining suspects for 16 months cannot be defended in any civilised country,” Mr Effiong, the human rights lawyer, said.
“No matter the gravity of the offence, there is a presumption of innocence under the constitution. If someone has committed an offence, take the person before the court and file the charge. Anything outside that is illegal.”
Investigating BDC Operators
The parallel exchange market in Nigeria has been poorly regulated and sometimes is a window for money laundering and terrorism financing.
GIABA currently identifies Nigeria as a high-risk money laundering and terrorism financing jurisdiction.
While Money Laundering and Terrorism Financing activities differ in many ways, they often exploit the same vulnerabilities in financial systems and the broader economy that allow for anonymity and opacity in transactions.
The Bola Tinubu administration has, however, decided to strengthen the regulation of BDCs.
In March, the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) revoked the licences of 4,173 BDC operators.
CBN said the affected institutions failed to observe compliance with the guidelines of the Anti-Money Laundering (AML), Countering the Financing of Terrorism (CFT), and Counter-Proliferation Financing (CPF) regulations, among other reasons.
Financial operations of Boko Haram
Since 2009, Nigeria has faced a tenacious terrorist insurgency from Boko Haram and its offshoot ISWAP, which has ties to ISIS and is among the deadliest groups in the world.
Nigeria has witnessed various attacks by terror groups that include drive-by-shooting, bombings, the use of Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) and suicide attacks. These acts of terrorism have led to the death of thousands of people, displacement, and large-scale destruction of property.
Nigerian authorities stated that these groups pose a formidable military threat and exercise substantial territorial control and influence in areas lacking formal commercial and financial infrastructure and relying on in-kind and cash transactions.
The group largely relies on informal or untraceable financial channels, including Forex dealers, hawaladars and cash couriers. Analysts said the group’s longevity can partly be attributed to its continued access to resources.
Since many of Nigeria’s north-eastern borders are not under the government’s effective control, cash couriers serve as an external conduit for Boko/ISWAP operatives, GIABA said. “In doing so, they take advantage of their connectivity to other jihadist groups operating in the region along with other smuggling and trading networks.”
Boko/ISWAP also raise funds through activities that are not inherently criminal, such as agriculture and trade in and around Lake Chad, as well as cattle markets and routes.
GIABA said such activities included the “extension of microloans (sometimes conscripting debtors who could not repay), control of small-scale traders’ markets and businesses, and donations and membership fees. Funds from outside affiliates and supporters, such as al-Shabaab, Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), and the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) core, are not considered major sources but cannot be excluded.”
Source: Premium Times
